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Seismic Risks Case Studies
Tatiana Ermolieva∗ and Yuri Ermoliev∗
22.1 Introduction
Losses from human-made and natural catastrophes are rapidly increasing. Within the last
three decades the direct damages only fromnatural disasters have increasedninefold (see [25,
34]). The main reason for this is the clustering of people and capital in hazard-prone areas
as well as the creation of new hazard-prone areas, a phenomenon that may be aggravated by
a lack of knowledge of the risks. It is estimated (see [35]) that within the next 50 years more
than a third of the world population will live in seismically and volcanically active zones.
Analysis of insurance companies shows that because of economic growth in hazard-prone
areas, damages due to natural catastrophes have grown at an average annual rate of 5%
[19]. The possibility of more frequent catastrophes dominates discussions of current global
changes. In fact, the main point of the climate change debates concerns the increasing
frequency of extreme ﬂoods, droughts, and windstorms rather than the increasing global
mean temperature which can be within the difference between the average temperature of
cities and their surrounding rural areas. Another source of catastrophes is associated with
increasing interdependencies among different countries. Dantzig [9] compares our society
with a busy highway where disruptions in one of its parts may lead to fundamental trafﬁc
jams in other parts.
The increasing vulnerability of our society calls for new integrated approaches to
economic developments and risk management with an explicit emphasis on the possibility
of catastrophes. The standard economic theory is dominated by truncated models of un-
certainties, represented by a ﬁnite manageable number of contingencies well known to the
whole society, which can, therefore, be priced and spread over the whole society through
∗International Institute forApplied SystemsAnalysis (IIASA),A-2361 Laxenburg,Austria (ermol@iiasa.ac.at,
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markets. Under such assumptions of certainty, catastrophes pose no special problems [3].
Insurance risk theory has developed independently of the fundamental economic ideas
(see discussion in [3, 20]). The central problem of this theory is modeling the probability
distribution of total future claims [23], which is then used to evaluate ruin probabilities,
premiums, reinsurance arrangements, etc. This theory essentially relies on the assumption
of independent, frequent, low-consequence (conventional) risks, such as car accidents, for
which decisions on premiums, estimates of claims, and likelihood of insolvency (probability
of ruin) can be calculated by using rich historical data. The frequent conventional risks also
permit simple “more-risks-are-better’’ strategies with simple trial-and-error or learning-by-
doing procedures for adjusting insurance decisions.
Catastrophes produce losses highly mutually dependent in space and time, which
challenges the standard risk pooling concepts and the standard extremal value theory [11].
The law of large numbers does not operate (in general), and the probability of ruin can
be reduced not just by pooling risks but only if insurers deliberately select the dependent
fractions of catastrophic risks they will cover. The existing extremal value theory deals
also primarily with independent events assuming these events are quantiﬁable by a single
number. Deﬁnitely catastrophes are not quantiﬁable events in this sense. They may have
quite different spatial and temporal patterns, which cause signiﬁcant heterogeneity of losses
in space and time. These losses can be dramatically affected by risk mitigation decisions
(say, by construction of a dike or a ﬂood retention area) and loss spreading schemes within
a country or on the international level through the insurance or ﬁnancial markets.
Catastrophe modeling [43] is becoming increasingly important in risk management
for estimating dependent catastrophic losses and making decisions on the allocation of
coverage, premiums, reinsurance agreements, and the effects of mitigation measures.
The aim of this paper is to show that the choice of decisions in the presence of
catastrophic risks can be regarded as a stochastic optimization problem. This discussion
closely follows the papers [1, 2, 14, 15, 17, 18]. Section 22.2 illustrates the peculiarities
of emerging stochastic optimization problems by using a typical model of risk theory.
Section 22.3 provides more motivations by outlining important case studies. Sections 22.4
and 22.5 discuss a rather general model attempting to bridge decision-oriented economic
theorywith risk theory and catastrophemodeling. Riskmanagement decisions are evaluated
from perspectives of the welfare growth in the region. We use such economically sound risk
measures as expected costs of overpayments and borrowing, which have strong connection
with standards in the insurance business, the insolvency and stability constraints, and the
conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR) type of risk measures. Section 22.6 discusses the results
of the case study in the seismic-prone Toscana region of Italy. Section 22.7 outlines the
computational procedure.
22.2 The standard insurance risk model
Consider a simple model of growth under shocks, which is a stylized version of insurance
business [10]. Themain variable of concern is the risk reserve rt at time t : rt = r0+πt −At ,
t ≥ 0, where πt , At are aggregated premiums and claims, and r0 is the initial risk reserve.
The process At = ∑N(t)k=1 Sk , where N(t), t ≥ 0, is a counting process for a number of
claims in interval [0, t] (e.g., a Poisson process) with N(0) = 0, and {Sk}∞1 is a sequence of
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independent and identically distributed random variables (claims), in other words, replicates
of a random variable S. The inﬂow of premiums πt pushes rt up, whereas the random
outﬂow At pushes rt down.
The main problem of risk theory [10, 23] is the evaluation of the ruin probability  =
P {rt ≤ 0 for some t , t > 0} under different assumptions on πt , At . There are several cases
where can be explicitly given, or at least given in a form suited for numerical calculations.
An important case ariseswhen the claim distribution is amixture of exponential distributions
and claims occur according to a Poisson process. There are numerous approximations for
the probability distribution of At . Most of them provide satisfactory results only in the area
of mean values and cannot be applied to catastrophes.
The typical actuarial analysis is based on the following. Assume that N(t) and Sk
are independent, N(t) has intensity α, i.e., E{N(t)} = αt , and πt = πt , π > 0. Then the
expected proﬁt over the interval [0, t] is (π −αES)t ; that is, the expected proﬁt increases in
time for π −αES > 0. The difference π −αES is the “safety loading.’’ The strong law of
large numbers implies that [πt −At ]/t → [π −αES] with probability 1. Therefore, in the
case of positive safety loading, π > αES, we have to expect that the real random proﬁt πt −
At for large enough t would also be positive under the appropriate choice of premium π =
(1+ρ)αES, where ρ is the “relative safety’’ loading, ρ = (π −αES)/αES. But this holds
only if the ruin does not occur before time t . This is a basic actuarial principle: premiums
are calculated by relying on the mean value of aggregated claims increased by the (relative)
safety loading. Thus, practical actuarial approaches ignore complex interdependencies
among timing of claims, their sizes, and the possibility of ruin, rt ≤ 0. The random
jumping process rt is simply replaced by a linear in t function rt = r0 + (π − αES)t .
Various decision variables affect . Claim size S depends on the coverages of the
insurer from different locations. Important decision variables are r0, π , and reinsurance
arrangements, for example, the “excess of loss’’ reinsurance contract. In this case, the
insurer retains only a portion, S(x) = min{S, x}, x ≥ 0, of a claim S, and the remaining
portion is passed to the reinsurer. The reinsurance contracts with deductibles are deﬁned
by two variables x = (x1, x2). In this case S(x) = max{x1,min[S, x2]} − x1, x1 ≥ 0,
x2 ≥ 0 is retained by the insurer. The reduction of  to acceptable levels can be viewed as
a chance constraint problem [38]. The complexity is associated with the jumping process
At with analytically intractable dependencies of At on decision variables, which restricts
the straightforward use of conventional stochastic optimization (STO) methods. The direct
sample mean estimation of (x) requires a very large number of observations and leads to
discontinuous functions. The following simple idea can be used for rather general problems
to overcome these difﬁculties.
Consider t = 0, 1, . . . , and assume that rt can be subdivided into a “normal’’ part
(including r0), Mt , associated with ordinary claims, and a “catastrophic’’ part Bt , πt = πt ,
where π is the rate of premiums related to catastrophes; the probability of a catastrophic
eventp is characterized by a probability distribution in an interval [p, p], and the probability
distribution Vt(z) = P [Mt < z] can be evaluated. Assume also that ruin may occur only
due to a catastrophe. Then the probability of ruin after the ﬁrst catastrophe and with the




p(1 − p)t−1Vt(min{x, Bt } − πt). (22.1)
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In general cases we can use an arbitrary “small’’ auxiliary random variable instead
of Mt [14, 15]. Deﬁnitely, (22.1) enables us to evaluate (x) much faster (fast Monte
Carlo sampling) in contrast to direct evaluation of (x) by straightforward Monte Carlo
sampling. This is the main idea in dealing with rare catastrophic events. The search for a
desirable x can be based on methods outlined in section 22.7.
22.3 Overview of case studies
Tobetter understand themain features of themodel described in the next section, let us sketch
out some case studies [1, 2, 17] carried out at the International Institute forApplied Systems
Analysis (IIASA). The main concern of these case studies is related to issues emphasized
by Froot in [19]. Froot admitted that most of the catastrophic losses
are paid ex-post by some combination of insurers and reinsurers (and their in-
vestors), insured, state and federal agencies and taxpayers, with only some of
these payments being explicitly arranged ex-ante. This introduces considerable
uncertainty about burden sharing into the system, with no particular presump-
tion that the outcome will be fair. The result is incentives for players to shift
burdens towards others, from the homeowner who builds on exposed coastline,
to insurers who write risks that appear highly proﬁtable in the absence of a
large event. . . . But most importantly, bad or inefﬁcient risk sharing raises the
cost of capital for companies and requires returns for households, reducing the
amount of proﬁtable investments and the rate of growth of the economy. . . it
is worth noting that the gains from higher growth rate are huge. . . .
For Hungary [24], facing special problems of a poor and immobile population, ex
ante mechanisms to fund the costs of recovery and, in particular, the establishment of a
multipillar ﬂood loss-sharing program, are especially important. In the analysis of the
Upper Tisza river pilot region [17] it is assumed, in particular, that for the ﬁrst pillar the
government would provide compensation of a limited amount to all households that suffer
losses from ﬂooding. As the second pillar, a special regional fund would be established
through a mandatory public ﬂood insurance on the basis of location-speciﬁc risk exposures.
It is assumed that the governmental ﬁnancial aid is regulated through this fund. As a third
pillar, a contingent credit may also be available to provide an additional injection of capital
to stabilize the system. In the latter case, the lender charges a fee that the borrower (in our
case, the fund) pays as long as the trigger event does not occur. If the event does occur, the
borrower rapidly receives the fund. The advantages of this ﬁnancial arrangement in contrast
to catastrophic bonds are discussed, e.g., in [37].
Such a programwould increase the responsibility of individuals and local governments
for ﬂood risks and losses. Local governments may be more effective in the evaluation and
enforcement of loss-reduction and loss-spreadingmeasures, but this is possible only through
location-speciﬁc analysis of potential losses, the mutual interdependencies of these losses,
and the sensitivities of the losses to new risk management strategies.
The lack of historical data is amain challenge in dealingwith rare catastrophes. Purely
adaptive, learning-by-doing types of approachesmay be very expensive and dangerous. The
development of models can be viewed as a mitigation measure enabling the simulation of
probable catastrophes for designing ex ante preparedness programs.
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The analysis of possible gains and losses from different arrangements of the program
outlined above is a multidisciplinary task, which has to take into account the frequency and
intensity of hazards, the stock of capital at risk, its structural characteristics, and different
measures (in particular, engineering, ﬁnancial) of vulnerability. These efforts require the
development of so-called catastrophe models [43]. For this purpose, Ermolieva et al. [17]
discuss a GIS-based catastrophe model developed for the Upper Tisza pilot region that, in
the absence of historical data, simulates samples of mutually dependent potential losses at
different locations. The model emphasizes the cooperation of various agents in dealing with
catastrophes. The solution to catastrophic risk management, especially for small economies
with limited risk absorption capacity, cannot be accomplished (see [2, 8, 37]) without pool-
ing of risk exposures. The proposed model involves pooling risks through mandatory ﬂood
insurance based on location-speciﬁc exposures, partial compensation to the ﬂood victims
by the central government, and a contingent credit to the pool. This program encourages
accumulation of regional capital to better buffer international reinsurance market volatility.
To stabilize the program such economically sound risk indicators as expected overpayments
by individuals (cells of ﬂood-prone areas) and an expected shortfall of the mandatory in-
surance are used. These indicators together with the so-called stopping times orient the
analysis toward the most destructive scenarios. It was shown (see [14, 15] and references
therein) that the explicit introduction of ex post borrowing (see also section 22.5) as a mea-
sure against insolvency enables us to approximate the insolvency constraint by a convex
optimization problem, whereas the use of the contingent credit leads to the CVaR type of
risk measures.
For the seismic-prone Irkutsk region in Russia [2], the focus of the analysis was on
the feasibility of an insurance pool to cover catastrophic losses subject to strong standard
insolvency regulations. In contrast to the case study in Hungary, the contribution of dif-
ferent insurers to the stability of the pool was explicitly analyzed by taking into account
the transaction costs and effects of mutual dependencies among claims from different loca-
tions (cells).
Many authors have stressed the need for better models to improve established insur-
ance practices for evaluating catastrophe coverages (see, for instance, [43]). Such models
can be even more critical for guidance and setting regulations in countries that are mov-
ing toward market economies. In Russia [2] new legislative instruments and government
resolutions are creating a framework for risk management similar to that existing in the
OECD countries. However, in Russia and other transition countries the emergence of a
viable insurance industry is slow and subject to insolvency risks due to problems of the
national economies, the lack of consolidated experience and practicable guidance, and the
lack of sufﬁcient risk reserves of the existing companies. For example, when insurance is
available in seismic regions, premiums neither are based on the probability of occurrence
of earthquakes nor do they differentiate among geological situations and construction type.
The model proposed in [1, 2] is a pilot exercise, which, however, can create the basis for
cooperation among researches, insurers, and regulatory bodies in transition countries. In the
case of Russia’s emerging insurance industry, cooperation among insurers will undoubtedly
play an important role in stabilizing the insurance market. A key problem, however, is the
lack of necessary information on the distribution of losses among locations. For this purpose
the region-speciﬁc earthquake generator (see [5, 42]) was designed and incorporated within
the STO model [1, 2].
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The case study for the seismic-prone Italian region especially illustrates the fact that
neither the market nor the government will be acceptable as the mechanism for catastrophic
risk management. Thus, some form of a public-private partnership may be appropriate [30].
Awell-known example of a government acting as a primary insurer is theUnited States
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which seeks to provide insurance at actuarially
fair premiums combined with incentives for communities and homeowners to take appro-
priate loss-reducing measures. Given the size of the United States and the large number
of persons living in ﬂood plains, the program is sufﬁciently diversiﬁed to cover most re-
gional losses with premium payments. In contrast to the NFIP, some government insurance
schemes in Europe, e.g., the French national insurance program, cross subsidize claims.
This is because the French constitution (1946, 1958) established the principle of “the sol-
idarity and equality of all French citizens facing the expenses incurred through national
calamities’’ [21].
However, even if many governments are pursuing policies to reduce their role in
compensating victims, a study [31] conﬁrms that the victims and their governments bear the
major losses from natural disasters and, worldwide, there is only moderate risk transfer with
insurance. An important consideration for national insurance strategies is linking private
insurance with mitigation measures to reduce losses. Insurers, however, are reluctant to
enter markets that expose them to a risk of bankruptcy. In the United States, for example,
many insurers have pulled out of catastrophic risk markets in response to their large losses
from natural catastrophes in the last decade [25].
To reduce their risk of insolvency, insurers’ strategies may be based on modeling tools
that account for the complexity implied by the manifold dependencies in the stochastic
process of catastrophic events, decisions, and losses. For example, to study the problem in
its complexity for the Toscana region, a spatial-dynamic, stochastic optimization model has
been developed in [13, 14, 16, 18] and is described below.
In Italy, a law for integrating insurance in the overall risk management process was
proposed only in late 1997 (within the Design of Law 2793: “Measures for the stabilization
of the public ﬁnance’’). This opened a debate, which has not yet been concluded by a
legislative act. Therefore policy options for a national insurance strategy are still open to
investigation. The Institute for Research on Seismic Risk of the Italian National Research
Council made data from a previous study available [36]. These have been incorporated into
a Monte Carlo catastrophe model, which simulates occurrence of earthquakes affecting the
region, calculates attenuation according to the geological characteristics, and ﬁnally deter-
mines the acceleration at the ground in each municipality. The model explicitly incorporates
the vulnerability of the built environment, with data on number and types of buildings in
each municipality of the region.
Since the discussion of GIS-based catastrophe models deserves a separate paper,
our analysis in the next sections is concentrated primarily on the evaluation of different
catastrophic risk management policies assuming that mutually dependent spatial losses are
generated in time and space (cells) by a catastrophe model.
22.4 STO model
Catastrophes may lead to large costs, social disruption, and economic stagnation. A catas-
trophe would ruin many agents if their risk exposures were not properly managed. To design
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safe catastrophic risk management strategies it is necessary to deﬁne at least the following:
patterns of possible disasters in space and time, a map of regional values and their vulnera-
bility, and feasible decisions, e.g., insurance coverages. The model of this section uses this
information. It emphasizes the collective nature of catastrophe risk management. The aim
of this model is to address only main features of the problem. Basically, we assume that
the goal of the insurance sector is to maximize its wealth while maintaining survival and
stability of growth (see also the discussion in [41]). In a similar manner, other agents are
concerned with their sustained wealth growth, whereas the main concern of the government
is the sustained welfare growth of the region. The model emphasizes catastrophe risk man-
agement as a long-term business rather than as subject of annual accounting and taxation.
Accordingly, catastrophe reserves should be accumulated over years.
Assume that the study region is divided into subregions or cells j = 1,m. A cell may
correspond to a collection of households, a zone with similar seismic activity, a watershed,
a grid with a segment of a gas pipeline, etc. The choice of cells provides a desirable
representation of losses. For each cell j there exists an estimate of its wealth at time t
that may include the value of infrastructure, houses, factories, etc. A sequence of random
catastrophic events ω = {ωt , t = 0, T − 1} affects different cells j = 1,m and generates
at each t = 0, T − 1 mutually dependent losses Ltj (ω), i.e., damages of the wealth at j ; T
is a time horizon. These losses can be modiﬁed by various decision variables. Some of the
decisions reduce losses, say, a dike, whereas others spread them on a regional, national, and
international level, e.g., insurance contracts, catastrophe securities, credits, and ﬁnancial
aid. If x is the vector of the decision variables, then the losses Ltj (ω) are transformed into
Ltj (x, ω). For example, we can think of Ltj (x, ω) as Ltj (ω) being affected by the decisions
of the insurance to cover losses from a layer [xj1, xj2] at a cell j in the case of a disaster at
time t :
Ltj (x, ω) = Ltj (ω) − max{xj1,min[xj2, Ltj ]} + xj1 + πtj ,
where max{xj1,min[xj2, Ltj ]}−xj1 are retained by insurance losses, andπtj is the premium.
In the most general case, the vector x comprises decision variables of different agents,
including governmental decisions, such as the height of a new dike or a public compensation




j . The insurance decisions concern pre-
miums paid by individuals and the payments of claims in the case of catastrophe. There are
complex interdependencies among these decisions, which call for the cooperation of agents.
For example, the partial compensation of catastrophe losses by the government enforces
decisions on loss reductions by individuals and, hence, increases the insurability of risks and
helps the insurance industry to avoid insolvency. On the other hand, the insurance combined
with risk-reduction measures can reduce losses, compensations, and governmental debt and
stabilize the economic growth of the region and the wealth of individuals.
We assume that ω is an element of a probability space (,F, P ), where  is a set
of all possible ω and F is a σ -algebra of measurable (with respect to probability measure
P ) events from . Let {Ft } be a nondecreasing family of σ algebras, Ft ⊆ Ft+1, Ft ⊆ F .
Random losses Ltj (ω) are assumed to beFt -measurable; i.e., they depend on the observable
catastrophes until time t . In the following we specify dependencies of these variables on ω,
although sometimes we do not use ω when these dependencies are clear from the text.
Catastrophe losses are shared by many participants, such as individuals (cells), gov-
ernments, insurers, reinsurers, and investors. In the model we call them “agents,’’ since the
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main balance equations of our model are similar for all of them. For each agent i a variable
of concern is the wealth Wti at time t = 0, T
Wt+1i (ω) = Wti (x, ω) + I ti (x, ω) − Oti (x, ω), i = 1, n, t = 0, T − 1, ω ∈ ,
(22.2)
where W 0i is the initial wealth. This is a rather general process of accumulation, which,
depending on the interpretation, can describe the accumulation of reserve funds, the dynam-
ics of contamination, or processes of economic growth with random disturbances (shocks),
reserves of the insurance company at moment t , the gross national product of a country, or
the accumulated wealth of a speciﬁc region. In more general cases, when catastrophes may
have profound effects on economic growth, this model can be generalized to an appropriate
version of economic-demographic model (see, for example, in [32]) enabling it to represent
movements of individuals and the capital accumulation processes within the economy.
For the simplicity of the exposition we do not discuss discount rates in these equations
since catastrophes require nonstandard approaches. In particular, induced by catastrophes,
discount rates become important, which is evident from the evaluation (22.1). We use also
the same index i for quite different agents. Therefore, the variables I ti (x, ω), Oti (x, ω)
may have quite a different meaning. For example, for each insurer i we can think of
I ti as premiums πti which are ex ante arranged and do not depend on ω, whereas Oti is
deﬁned by the claim size Sti and possible transaction costs which triggers a random jump
of the risk reserve Wti (usually denoted as Rti ) downward at random times of catastrophic
events (as in the simple model of section 22.2). If i corresponds to a cell, then income
I ti may be affected by a catastrophic event ω generated by a catastrophe model. The
incomes I ti can be deﬁned by a set of scenarios or through a regional growth model with
geographically explicit distribution of the capital among cells. The term Oti may include
losses Lti , taxes and premiums paid by i. For central or local governmental agent i (e.g.,
mandatory insurance, catastrophe fund) I ti may include a portion of taxes collected by the
government (compensations of losses by the government), andOti may consist of mitigation
costs, debts, loans, and fees paid for ex ante contingent credits.
Catastrophes may cause strong dependencies among claims Sti for different insurers
i. These claims are deﬁned by decisions on coverages of losses Ltj from different locations
j . For example, let us denote by xtij a searched fraction of Ltj covered by insurer i, e.g.,
assume i = 1, n. Then
n∑
i=1
xtij ≤ 1, xtij ≥ 0, j = 1,m, (22.3)
and claims Sti are linear functions of x = {xtij , i = 1, n, j = 1,m, t = 0, T − 1}:





ij , i = 1, n, t = 0, T − 1.
If I ti , Oti simply correspond to premiums πti and claims Sti , then the wealth of insurer
i (its risk reserves) are calculated for t = 0, T − 1, ω ∈  as follows:
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where πtij are rates of premiums per unit of coverage.
For each i consider a stopping time τi for process Wti (x, ω), i.e., a random variable
with integer values, t = 0, T . The event {ω : τi = t}with ﬁxed t depends only on the history
till t , and it corresponds to the decision to stop process Wti (x, ω) after time t . Therefore, τi
in the case of Wti deﬁned according to (22.4) depends on {xkij , i = 1, n, j = 1,m, k = 0, t};
i.e., it is a function τi(x, ω). Examples of τi may be τi = T , the time of the ﬁrst catastrophe,
or the time of the ruin before a given time T : τi(x, ω) = min{T ,min[t : Wti (x, ω) < 0,
t > 0]}. The last example deﬁnes τi as a rather complex implicit function of x.
Assume that each agent i maximizes (possibly negative) wealth at t = τi . The
notion of wealth at t requires exact deﬁnition since it must represent, in a sense, the whole
probability distribution Wti . The traditional expected value EWti may not be appropriate
for probability distributions of Wti affected by rare catastrophes of high consequences. As a
result they may have a multimode structure with “heavy tails.’’ We can think of the estimate
for Wti as a maximal value V ti , which does not overestimate, in a sense, random value Wti ,
i.e., cases when mins≤t (W ti (q, ω) − V ti ) < 0. Formally, V ti can be chosen by maximizing
V + γE min{0,W ti − V } (22.5)
or a more general function V + γEd(Wti − V ) for appropriate function d(·) and γ > 0.
The second term can be considered as the risk of overestimating the wealth Wsi (x, ω) for
s = 0, 1, . . . , t . This concept corresponds to the CVaR risk measure (see [4, 27, 40]). The
maximization of (22.5) is a simple example of the so-called stochastic maximin problems.
It is easy to see from the optimality conditions for this problem (see [12, pp. 165, 416]) that
for continious distributions the optimal value V satisﬁes condition P [Wti ≤ V ] = 1/γ . For
the normal distribution and γ = 2, it coincides with the traditional mean value EWti . In
the case of quadratic function d(·) and γ = ∞, i.e., the maximization of E(Wti − V )2, the
optimal V = EWti .
Besides the maximization of wealth, the agent i is concerned with the risk of insol-
vency, i.e., when Wsi < 0 for some s = 0, 1, . . . , t , as well as the lack of sustained growth,
i.e., when I si − Osi < 0 for some s = 0, 1, . . . , t . In accordance with this consider the
stochastic goal functions



















i (x, ω) − Osi (x, ω)]
}
,
Fi(x, V ) = Ef τi(x,ω)i (x, V , ω), (22.6)
where nonnegative γi , δi , βi are substitution coefﬁcients between wealth V ti and risks of
overestimating wealth, insolvency, and overestimating sustained growth. If a catastrophe
is considered as the most distractive event, then we can use in the deﬁnition of f ti simply
s = t instead of mins≤t . These requirements reﬂect survival and stability constraints of
agents. In (22.6) we use a modiﬁed form of (22.5), which is more appropriate for dynamic
problems. Each agent attempts to maximize Fi(x, V ).
Pareto optimal improvements of risk situationswith respect to goal functionsFi(x, V )
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of different agents can be achieved by maximizing
W(x, V ) =
n∑
i=1
αiFi(x, V ) (22.7)
for different weights αi ≥ 0, ∑ni=1 αi = 1. These weights reﬂect the importance of the
agents. The maximization of W(x, V ) for different weights αi , i = 1, n, corresponds to a
stochastic version of the welfare analysis [22].
When n > 1, this model generalizes Borch’s [7] fundamental ideas of risk sharing
to the case of catastrophic risks. In the Borch model risks from different locations are
substitutable, and the insurance pool is concerned only with the redistribution of the total
riskmass. According to (22.3), ourmodel emphasizes differences among risks fromdifferent
locations, i.e., m > 1 in contrast to m = 1 of Borch’s model.
Random functions f ti (x, V , ω) have a complex nested analytically intractable struc-
ture deﬁned by simulated patterns of catastrophes. Their nonsmooth character is due to the
presence of operators min and stopping times τi , which may be complex implicit functions
of (x, ω). When f ti (x, V , ω) are concave functions in x as min of linear functions, then
expectations Fi(x, V ) = Ef ti (x, V , ω) are also concave functions in x for ﬁxed t . The use
of stopping times, t = τi , generally destroys their concavity and even continuity. If stopping
times do not depend on x, then these expectations are also concave. The use of such risk
functions as in (22.5) is similar to the [33] mean-semivariance model and the [29] model
with absolute deviations. Connections of problems (22.5) with the CVaR risk measure are
established in [40].
The choice of weights (risk coefﬁcients) γi , δi , βi , provides different trade-offs be-
tween wealth and risks. The increase of these parameters better eliminates corresponding
risks.
22.5 Insolvency, stopping time, and nonsmooth risk
functions
A key issue for selecting catastrophic risk portfolios is the ﬁnancial ruin of insurers. It was
shown (see [13]), that when risk coefﬁcients γi , δi , βi in (22.7) become large enough, then






W si < 0, i = 1, n
]
≤ p. (22.8)
The maximization problem deﬁned by (22.6)–(22.7) is much simpler than the problem
deﬁned in terms of the chance constraint (22.8). The functions Fi(x, V ) deﬁned according
to (22.6) for Wti (x, ω) := Rti (x, ω) are concave, whereas constraints (22.8) for the same
case may have discontinuitous character, e.g., if ω has a discrete distribution. The problem
deﬁned in terms of the chance constraints (22.8) has a convex feasible set only under a
strong assumption on the probability measure.
The discontinuous nature of the problem (22.6)–(22.7) may still be connected with
the stopping time deﬁned as the ruin (insolvency) moment. Different smoothing techniques
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for this case are analyzed in [15]. In particular, a rather natural idea of smoothing consists
of introducing the possibility of borrowing money in the case of insolvency. It is natural
to expect that when the payment for borrowing is high, agents will tend to exclude such a
necessity through a reasonable selection of the portfolios, i.e., to keep constraints on the
insolvency within reasonable limits. Let us slightly modify the process (22.2):
Wt+1(x, y, ω) = Wt(x, y, ω) + I t (x, ω) − Ot(x, ω) + yt+1 − (1 + βt )yt , (22.9)
where for the simplicity of notation we do not use here index i, yt is a value of borrowing
on the interval [t − 1, t), βt is the bank interest for the credit on the interval [t − 1, t),
and y = {y0, . . . , yT }. According to (22.9), the borrowing taken out at the moment t to
maintain solvency should be paid off at the next instant of time t + 1 with interest βt . If the
reserves of the company are not sufﬁcient for this purpose, then new loans are taken. The
following fact is the key for dealing with discontinuities of the stopping time effects and
the insolvency constraints. Let us represent the process Wt(x, y, ω) as
Wt(x, y, ω) = W˜ t (x, ω) −
t−1∑
s=1
βsys + yt , W˜ t (x, ω) = W 0 +
t∑
s=1
(I s(x, ω) − Os(x, ω))
and let (x∗(β), V ∗(β), y∗(β)) be a solution of the following problem: maximize
F(x, V ) = E max
y≥0
[f T (x, V, y, ω) − (1 + βT )yT ], W t(x, y, ω) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
(22.10)
where f t (x, V , y, ω) is deﬁned as in (22.6) for Wt(x, y, ω) deﬁned according to (22.9).
Theorem 22.1 (see [15]). Assume that Rt(0) ≥ 0, P [W˜ t (x, ω) = 0] = 0, for any x ∈ X,
t = 1, T . Then the probability of borrowing can be arbitrarily small by taking interest
coefﬁcients βt , t = 1, T , large enough, i.e., P [W˜ t (x∗(βt ), ω) ≥ 0, t = 1, T ] → 1 almost
surely for min1≤t≤T βt → ∞.
22.6 The Tuscany region case study
We now specify the general model described in section 22.4 to the Tuscany region. The
region has been subdivided intoM ≈ 300 subregions, which correspond to the number of its
municipalities. For each municipality j , number and types of buildings, their vulnerability,
and number of built cubic meters are available. These represent the estimate of wealthWj in
the municipality j . Using data and models in [36], a catastrophe generator has been created
(see [2, 5, 42]) using the Gütenberg–Richter law and the attenuation characteristics of the
region (see Figure 22.1). This enables us to generate the occurrences of earthquakes at ran-
dom time moments, intensities, and accelerations in each municipality. The generator could
be easily adapted to incorporate different kinds of distributions, non-Poissonian catastrophic
processes, as well as microzoning within a municipality. It produces earthquake scenarios
at random time moments according to geophysical characteristics of faults and soil type.
Simulated in time and space, earthquakes ω0, . . . , ωt may occur in different munic-
ipalities, inside or outside the region, have random magnitudes, and, therefore, affect a
random number of municipalities.
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Figure 22.1. Earthquake generator.
In municipalities affected at time t the vulnerability relations between accelerations
and losses [36] according to the type (masonry or reinforced concrete), age, andmaintenance
of the buildings are used to estimate the number of cubic meters of destroyed properties.
The economic loss of destroyed cubic meters of a building is deﬁned as the cost for their
reconstruction. Then it is possible to be independent of contingent pricing by considering the
cost of reconstruction per cubic meters to be the monetary unit. In this way the simulation of
time histories for possible earthquakes in the region produces the sets of economical losses
and enables the design of an insurance program. It also enables us to determine in which
way preventive retroﬁtting could decrease the losses: this is easily done by a consequent
decrease of the vulnerability indices in the loss model. In this way it is possible to study the
interplay between structural measures and risk sharing for an integrated risk management
approach and to design an insurance system linked to incentives for retroﬁtting of the built
environment. Our analysis was primarily concerned with the following. In its early version
the Italian Design of Law 2793 (1998), to reduce the impact of natural disasters on the
governmental budget, included in provisions for an insurance program against all natural
hazards. It was intended not to make this insurance mandatory, but to make mandatory the
extension of a ﬁre insurance policy to all natural hazards, in a way similar to the French
system (see section 22.3). In addition to tax incentives for such an insurance, it stipulated
a maximum exclusion layer of 25%, the creation of a pool of insurance companies with an
appropriate reserve fund, e.g., corresponding to the annual average government payment
for compensating losses (with some forms of state guarantee to be speciﬁed further), and
linking of the premium to the premium for ﬁre policy. This article was withdrawn, and later
proposals are still the subject of discussion.
Starting from these principles, the case study intends to demonstrate how the model
analyzes and offers the decision makers different policy options. Let us assume that an
insurance company (this might be a pool of companies or the government itself acting as
an insurer) covers a fraction, e.g., q = 0.75, of earthquake losses. The rest ν = 1 − q,
according to the Italian Design of Law, would be compensated by the state. The state would
also be expected to feed the reserve funds in case of excessive losses.
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The company has an initial catastrophe fund or a risk reserve R0, which in general is
characterized by a random variable dependent on past catastrophic events. It is also possible
to analyze needs for the future as R0 a policy variable. For example, taking R0 = 0 enables
us to evaluate the capacity of the region to accumulate risk reserves in the future. Assume
that the time span consists of t = 1, T , T = 50, time intervals. The stopping time τ is
the time of the ﬁrst catastrophe in the region within the time horizon T . The risk reserve
(wealth) Rt of the pool at time t = 1, T is calculated according to (22.4):







where q deﬁnes the coverage of the pool in affected municipalities j at time t , πj is the
premium rate from the municipality j , and Ltj (ωt ) is the loss (damage) at j caused by the
simulated catastrophic event ωt at time t . The value Ltj (ωt ) depends on the event ωt , the
content of j , mitigation measures, and deterioration of the built environment. The analytical
structure of the probability distribution of the random variable Rt is intractable; therefore,
the methodology relies on Monte Carlo simulation.
Standard actuarial approaches calculate premiums in accordance with loss expecta-
tions. Therefore this study analyzed two policy options based on similar principles:
1. premiums based on the average damage over all municipalities (solidarity principle,
bringing less exposed locations to pay premiums equal to more severely exposed
ones, as in the spirit of the proposed insurance program); and
2. location-speciﬁc premiums based on average damage in the particular municipality,
i.e., risk-based premiums.
However, the use of average losses may be misleading in the case of heavy-tailed
distributions which are typical for catastrophic losses. The stochastic optimizations allows
the analysis of different criteria and takes into account dependencies among location-speciﬁc
losses. As an important example, a third policy option has been considered:
3. premiums calculated in a way that equalizes in a fair manner the risk of instability for
the insurance company and the risk of premium overpayment for exposed munici-
palities. Besides this, it was important to analyze location-speciﬁc coverages and the
amount of governmental compensation as a decision variable.
For option 3 it was assumed that the pool maximizes its wealth (risk reserves) taking
into account the risks of the insolvency under the constraint on “fair’’ premiums. Fair
premiums are deﬁned according to the speciﬁed probability (say, once in every 100 years)
of cases when paid premiums exceed actual claim sizes.
Accordingly, the goal function (22.6) for the pool at t = τ , R0 = 0, is deﬁned as
f τ (x, V , ω) = V + γ min{0, Rτ (x, ω) − V } + δ min{0, Rτ (x, ω)}.
The stability of the welfare growth of municipalities can be written in the form of the
chance constraints on overpayments
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Figure 22.2. Distribution of municipality-speciﬁc premiums (per building volume/
municipality, percent terms).
wherex = (π1, . . . , πn, q1, . . . , qn), x ≥ 0,p is a given “safety’’level. Thedifferenceq−qj
deﬁnes the partial coverages of some municipalities, which generates the demand for further
increase of the compensation by the government. The wealth of municipalities at t = τ
changes due to the insuranceprogram fromWτj −Lτj toWτ+j = Wτj −Lτj+(1−q+qj )Lτj−πj .
The stochastic goal function (22.6) for municipality j at t = τ is
f τj (x, Vj , ω) = Vj + γj min{0,Wτ+j − Vj } + δj min{0, (1 − q + qj )Lτj − πj }.
Figures 22.2–22.6 illustrate some numerical results. The number of simulations is shown
on the vertical axis.
For option 1, where the burden of losses is equally distributed over the population,
the simulation of catastrophic losses showed that the annual premium is equal to the ﬂat
rate of 0.02 monetary units (m.u.) per cubic meter of building.
For option 2, Figure 22.2 shows the distribution of municipality-speciﬁc premiums
based on average damage in each municipality (or according to the municipality-speciﬁc
risk). There is a prevailing number of municipalities (about 220) that have to pay 0.02–0.03
m.u., which is close to the ﬂat rate of 0.02, as in option 1. About 20 municipalities are at
no risk at all (0 rate). Municipalities more exposed to the risk have to pay 0.04 and higher
rates (more than 50 municipalities).
Figure 22.3 shows the distribution of the insurers’ reserve (cumulated at τ within 50
years) at premiums of option 2. The volume of capital is shown on the horizontal axis. The
probability of insolvency (when the risk reserve accumulated up to the catastrophe is not
enough to compensate incurred losses) is indicated on the right-hand ordinate axis. There
is a rather high probability of “small’’ insolvency (values −90, −40 occurred 190 and 90
times out of 500 fast simulations, as discussed in sections 22.2 and 22.7). High solvency
(more than 500 m.u.) occurred in about 10% of the simulations. The size of insolvency
would represent the cost to the government to cover losses uncovered by the pool. Another
option may be to transfer a fraction of losses to international ﬁnancial markets, as analyzed
in [17].
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Figure 22.3. Distribution of insurer’s reserve, options 1 and 2 (thousands m.u., 50 years).
Figure 22.4. Distribution of fair premiums, option 3 (per building volume/
municipality, percent terms).
Figure 22.4 shows the distribution of premiums for option 3. According to this
principle, most of the municipalities (190) have to pay close to the ﬂat rate of 0.02–0.03
m.u. per cubic meter of a building. Rates of 0.04 and higher have to be paid by about
100 municipalities. In this case the highest premium rate is 0.5, which is much lower than
the highest rate of 1.2 of option 2. The distribution of the insurer’s reserve in Figure 22.5
indicates also the improvement of the insurer’s stability: the frequency of insolvency is
considerably reduced.
Figure 22.6 is very illustrative. For each municipality it shows the optional premiums
to be paid: the ﬂat premium rate of 0.02, the option 2 municipality-speciﬁc rate, and the fair
premium of option 3. Many municipalities in all three options have to pay the premium rate,
which is about the ﬂat rate (0.015–0.03). For quite a number of municipalities in option 2,
the rate signiﬁcantly exceeds the ﬂat rate. For these municipalities special attention should
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Figure 22.5. Distribution of insurers’reserve, option 3 (thousands m.u., over 50 years).
Figure 22.6. Comparison of options: municipality-speciﬁc, fair, and ﬂat (0.02)
premiums.
be given as to whether they are able to pay such high premiums. Option 3 allows one to
take such individual constraints on overpayments into account and work out the efﬁcient
premiums both for insurer and municipalities.
22.7 The solution procedure
From the discussion in section 22.4, it follows that the welfare functionW(x, V ) for the case
study in the Tuscany region is a concave function assuming that τ and Lτj do not depend
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on x. In this case the minimization of W(x, V ) can be approximately solved by linear
programming methods (see general discussion in [15]). The resulting linear approximation
may prove to have extremely large dimensions due to the large number of scenarios for
estimating the function being optimized. The main challenge arises in the case when τ and
Lτj are implicit functions of x. Then we can only use the stochastic quasi-gradient (SQG)
methods (see [12, 6]). Let us outline only the main idea of these techniques. More details
and further references are in [14, 15].
Assume that vector x incorporates not only risk management decision variables x
but also V and decisions affecting the efﬁciency of the sampling itself (for more detail,
see [16, 39]). An adaptive Monte Carlo optimization procedure (SQG method) searching
for a solution minimizing W(x) starts at any reasonable guess x0. It updates the solution
sequentially at steps k = 0, 1, . . . , by the rule xk+1 = xk − ρkξk , where numbers ρk >
0 are predetermined step sizes satisfying the condition
∑∞





For example, the speciﬁcation ρk = 1/(k + 1) would formally suit. Random vector ξk
is an estimate of the gradient Wx(x) or its analogs for nonsmooth function W(x). This
vector is easily computed from random observations of W(x). For example, let Wk be
a random observation of W(x) at x = xk and W˜ k be a random observation of W(x) at
x = xk + δkhk . The numbers δk are positive, δk → 0, k → ∞, and hk is an independent
observation of the vector h with components independent and uniformly distributed on
[−1, 1]. Then ξk can be chosen as ξk = [(W˜ k − Wk)/δk]hk . There is signiﬁcant ﬂexibility
in choosing ξk for estimating the gradient ofW(x) at x = xk . Some of them may lead to fast
convergence; others produce slow oscillating behavior. For example, the straightforward
estimation of function (x) in section 22.2 is time consuming. But due to formula (22.1)
we can use the following procedure. Consider any sequence of numbers μt > 0, t ≥ 1,∑∞
t=1 μt = 1. Step k + 1: choose tk with a probability μt from set t ∈ {1, 2, . . . }; generate
pk ∈ [p, p] and simulate claim Btkk by a catastrophe model. Calculate ξk = μ−1tk [p(1 −
p)tk−1V ′tk (min{xk, Btkk } − πtk)]ηk , where V ′t denotes the derivative of Vt(·), and ηk = 1 if
xk ≤ Btkk , and ηk = 0 otherwise. It is easy to see, e.g., from the discussion of the stochastic
minimax problems in [12, p. 165], that μ−1tk [p(1 − p)tk−1V ′tk (min{xk, Btkk } − πtk)]ηk is an
estimate of  ′(xk); i.e., its expected value is  ′(xk). The rate of asymptotic convergence of
this method (when the number of observations k → ∞) is similar to other sampling based
procedures.
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